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Introduction
The financial markets and the world economy as a whole are currently beset by huge uncertainty. What was sparked by a decrease of housing prices in the US eventually led to a near collapse of the global credit markets. In this article, we use empirical first significant digits (FSD) and theoretical Benford-like distributions (Benford, 1938; Grendar, Judge, & Schechter, 2007) to study the credit default swap (CDS) market during the financial crisis, which started in July 2007.
The reason we choose the CDS market as representative of the credit market is twofold: First, before the crisis, the CDS market was often lauded as an overthe-counter (OTC) market with prodigious risktransferring ability, which stabilizes the financial system as a whole (Greenspan, 2005) . Second, from being a fledgling market in the mid-nineties, the CDS market has grown tremendously over the last decade (Dechert LLP, 2008) and is currently an integral part of the financial system. This work has two main findings: First, we illustrate the usefulness of FSD distributions to verify the "quality" of such data "in some vague sense" (George & Laura, 2009; Varian, Morgan, Deaton, Cramer, & Bibby, 1972) . Particularly for the CDS market, this finding is essential because the CDS market is a decentralized OTC market and is often pictured as an opaque market with little information about pricing mechanisms, price setters and traded volumes. We find that for Europe and the US, the first digits follow an FSD distribution pattern similar to the proposed Benford-like FSD distribution; that is, the appearance of the first digits follow a weakly monotonic decreasing pattern as provided by (Benford, 1938; Grendar et al., 2007) .
Secondly, provided with daily data, we are interested in the development of the FSD distributions during the financial crisis of 2007. Here we find huge differences between the FSD distribution of US companies and that of European ones. Quite surprisingly, for US companies, the FSD distribution of the CDS spreads remained nearly stable during the financial crisis, which poses the question of why the CDS market of this region -which was the origin of the financial crisis -is more stable than the European market in terms of
This article is organized as follows: Section II briefly reviews the literature on FSD distributions and the CDS market. Section III describes our data. Section IV presents the main results of this article. Finally, our conclusions and discussions about further research follow.
Benford's Law, Benford-like Distributions and the CDS Market
Benford's Law (Benford, 1938 ) is an unexpected mathematical relationship that states that the FSDs of numerous examples of data follow a specific distribution and are not uniformly distributed, as one would expect. It postulates that the probability that the first digit is i = {1 . . . 9} is given by p(i) = log10 (1 + 1/i).
For example, 1 appears approximately 30.1% of the time as the first digit, and 9 appears only 4.6% of the time. Nearly 60 years later, (Hill, 1995) provides a rigorous proof of this law as well as the conditions under which it holds. Today, a wide range of data sets have been tested according to Benford's Law, e.g., (Clippe & Ausloos, 2012; Depken, 2008; Giles, 2007; Günnel & Todter, 2009) or (Ley, 1996) . Ley (1996) , for example, finds that 1-day returns of the S&P 500 are reasonably consistent with Benford's Law. In a similar vein, Corazza, Ellero, & Zorzi, (2010) discuss the S&P 500 stock market. Inter alia, they find that sequences of trading days not fulfilling the Benford distribution are rather short. Huge deviations from Benford's Law are often interpreted as signals of some type of irregularity, like psychological price barriers or price collusions (DeCeuster, Dhaene, & Schatteman, 1998; Giles, 2007) . However, the literature also shares the common result that we rarely find a perfect match of the observed FSDs to Benford's Law.
As noted by Scott and Fasli (2001) , only approximately one half of Benford's original data sets provide reasonably close fits to the Benford distribution. Therefore, Grendar et al. (2007) propose an information theoretic approach based on the first moments of the empirical FSDs to derive modifications of the Benford distribution -Benford-like distributions. The idea of this approach is to estimate a probability distribution R that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance to the Benford distribution and has a first moment equal to the empirical FSD mean. Distributions for different first moments of FSDs are tabulated in Grendar et al. (2007) . The resulting Benford-like distribution R provides a null distribution for testing empirical FSD distributions.
A broad range of literature analyzes the CDS market, e.g., Forte and Peña (2009); Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) ; Realdon (2008) . Jorion and Zhang (2007) study contagion effects in the CDS market due to Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 events.
Building on the work of Ley (1996) , who studied the stock market using Benford's Law, and Realdon (2008) , who linked the CDS market to the stock market, we study the CDS market using FSD and Benford-like distributions.
Data
As a basis to illustrate the distribution of the FSDs and to check the appropriateness of FSD distributions for studying the OTC market, we use daily Markit CDS data for European and US companies. Markit is one of the leading data providers specializing on pricing credit derivatives. According to Markit, the CDS spreads do not represent the actual traded spreads. In- The Markit data set contains CDS spreads in all four different restructuring versions. For studying FSD distributions, we do not exclude any of these restructuring mechanisms.
Our time series runs 868 days, which results in a total of 1.44 × 108 CDS spread observations.
For the different regions, we observe, on a daily average, 78, 289 observations for European companies and 88, 346 for US ones. Table 1 
Results

Reasonability of the data:
To verify the quality of our data, we use the approach proposed by Grendar et al. (2007) . Fig. 1 presents rootograms (Tukey, 1972) (Ley, 1996) . For sample sizes N less than 5000 observations, we would not reject the null at a significance level of 1%. The test statistic is given as the sum of the maximum distance above (D+ ) and below (D−) the cumulative distribution functions that are compared, i.e., V = D+ + D− (Kuiper, 1960) .
Empirical FSD development through the crisis:
Because we are interested in the development of the empirical FSD distributions during the financial crisis, A well known difference between the US and European CDS market is their composition in terms of credit quality. The US CDS market is broader in the sense of credit quality; that is, we observe more bad credit quality CDS entities. To take this fact into account, we split our data into "investments" and "subinvestments". The first group only contains entities with an average credit rating quality of at least A, whereas the second group contains all non-default entities below A, i.e., from BBB to CCC/C. The results for these two groups are illustrated in Fig. 3 . As we can see in both groups -investment and subinvestment companies -the FSD distribution for US entities is more stable. The higher FSD fluctuation of the investment-grade CDS market is caused by the fact that spreads are more concentrated at the lower end of the spread scale. That is, we mainly observe spreads below 100 bpts. Therefore, a change of the credit spreads is more likely to come along with a change in the FSD than for spreads above, e.g., 100bpts. However, as we can see from Figure 3 , splitting the data into investment and subinvestment grades does not sufficiently explain the regional differences in the FSD distributions. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the different document clauses for both European and US CDS spreads. We can infer from Table 3 that the proportion of traded CDS contracts with either full restructuring (CR) or modifiedmodified restructuring (MM) is much higher for European CDS entities than for US ones. More than two thirds of all traded European CDS entities belong to either CR or MM. For the US market, we find a majority -nearly two thirds -of traded CDS entities belonging to the other document clauses, modified restructuring (MR) and no restructuring (XR). Table 3 . Proportions of restructuring mechanisms in the CDS data. 
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To study the impact of the restructuring mechanism on the FSD distributions, Table 4 
Conclusion and Discussion
In this article, we study Benford- One possible reason for the observed differences could be that the European market was confronted with herding behavior during the crisis (Devenow & Welch, 1996) whereby market participants make their decisions by imitating the actions (prices) of others due to the increasing market uncertainty. The absence of herding in the US market may be traced back to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for US companies. In case of bankruptcy, Chapter 11 is lenient on debtors. Given an agreement with creditors, chapter 11 abdicates from liquidation and allows a debtor to continue and restructure its business. As a consequence, reorganization rates of bankruptcy are much higher in the US than in Europe, where such a restructuring clause is missing; however, in recent years several European countries have tried to change their bankruptcy norms in favor of the survival of companies. Where CDS are used as (hedging) instruments to protect against default risk in case of chapter 11 defaults, the protection seller is more flexible to recover claims from the reference entity. Our results nourish the notion that especially in stormy economic periods, the chapter 11 clause may affect the pricing mechanism. The absence of chapter 11 for European companies might imply that CDS spreads for European companies are more vulnerable to pricing malfunctions like herding.
Following (Trichet, 2007) and (Park & Sabourian, 2011) , in times of economic uncertainty, herding is an immanent problem in financial markets. Building on the work of Jorion and Zhang (2007) , who discuss contagion effects and the US bankruptcy clauses, this article sets the scene for further research, e.g., an investigation of herding in financial markets using FSD distributions.
